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of abandoning the business or waiving his right of appeal. Per-
haps subsequent cases in this field will develop a workable rule
which will allow a proper settlement of the rights of the parties
without forcing upon one of the parties a choice between unfair
financial hardship and waiver of his right to appeal.
A. E. Collier.
INSURANCE
INSURANCE COMPANY AS A NECESSARY PARTY
Arkansas. In McGeorge Contracting Co. v. Mizell' plaintiff sued
to recover $5,000 for personal injuries and $1,000 for damages
to his automobile. The jury found the defendant negligent and the
plaintiff free of contributory negligence and awarded the plaintiff
a judgment for $2,000. Plaintiff carried collision insurance with
the State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (with a
$25.00 deductible clause). Plaintiff's employer was subject to the
Arkansas Workmen's Compensation Act, and the Maryland Cas-
ualty Company was its insurer. The State Farm Company paid
the plaintiff $764.50 for damages to his automobile, and the Com-
pensation Commission awarded him $27.00 and his medical and
hospital bills in the amount of $164.00, which sums were paid by
the Maryland Casualty Company. On appeal defendant alleged as
error the action of the trial court in overruling his motion to re-
quire that the two insurance companies be made party plaintiffs.
Neither insurance company had sought to be made a party plain-
tiff. The question in the case was whether the two insurance com-
panies were necessary and indispensable parties to the suit.
The supreme court answered in the negative and affirmed the
trial court's judgment. The court stated the rule followed by the
weight of authority to be that where an insurance company has
only partially reimbursed an insured for his loss, the insured is
Ark .S26 . W. 2d 566 (1950).
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the real party in interest and can maintain the action. An insur-
ance company would be a proper party plaintiff, should it wish
to intervene, but it would not be a necessary or indispensable party.
The holding is in conformity with Arkansas Statutes 1947 An-
notated, Section 27-801, providing that every action must be prose-
cuted in the name of the real party in interest, and Section 27-
806, providing that all persons may join in one action as plaintiffs
if they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alterna-
tive in respect of, or arising out of the same transaction, occur-
rence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question
of law or fact common to all of them will arise in the action. The
theory is that the insured bears the relation of a trustee to the
insurer and that the wrongdoer should not have the cause of action
against him split so that he is compelled to defend two actions
for the same wrong.2
The insurer, while not a necessary party, may be a proper party.
In the case of Home Insurance Company v. Lack3 the insurance
company had paid part of the loss to the insured, and in a suit
against the tortfeasor, the insurance company was held to be a
proper party plaintiff.
SUBSTITUTED SERVICE ON FOREIGN NON-CONSENTING CORPORATION
Arkansas. In American Farmers Ins. Co. of Phoenix, Arizona v.
Thomason4 defendant insurance company was an Arizona corpo-
ration. The policy of insurance had been entered into in Cali-
fornia in 1944 while the insured, a resident of Arkansas, was
temporarily employed in California. The injury for which suit
was brought and which was covered by the policy occurred in Cali-
fornia. There was no evidence that defendant was doing business
in Arkansas at the time the policy was executed and delivered in
California. At the time of the suit, in 1949, defendant had been
doing business in Arkansas without authorization. By Arkansas
Statutes 1947 Annotated, Section 66-244, a foreign corporation
2 29 Am. JUR., Insurance, § 1358, p. 1016.
3 196 Ark. 888, 120 S. W. 2d 355 (1938).
4 --..----- Ark -------- , 234 S. W. 2d 37 (1950).
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doing unauthorized business in the state, and issuing or delivering
a policy of insurance to a citizen or resident, appoints the Insur-
ance Commissioner as its service agent in any action arising out
of the contract of insurance. Substituted service was had on defend-
ant, and a plea to the jurisdiction was filed. The trial court gave
plaintiff a judgment, and the defendant appealed. The question
raised was whether the substituted service was authorized by the
statute.
In reversing, the supreme court said the statute provided for
substituted service only in suits on a policy or contract issued to
a citizen or resident of Arkansas by an insurance company which
is doing business in Arkansas without authorization. In this suit,
not only was plaintiff's policy not issued in Arkansas, but there
was no evidence that defendant was doing any business in Arkan-
sas when the policy was issued. Seemingly substituted service
under the statute can be made only when the policy is issued in
Arkansas by a company which is doing unauthorized business
in Arkansas at the time. The court reasoned that the Due Process
Clause of the Federal Constitution would be violated if substi-
tuted service were allowed in this case. In Old Wayne Mutual Life
Ass'n of Indianapolis, Indiana v. McDonough' a statute similar
to the Arkansas statute was complied with, but substituted service
was held not to give the court jurisdiction because the cause of
action did not arise out of a business carried on, or other acts
done, in the state where suit was brought.
The policy behind substituted service statutes is to avoid the
inconvenience which would result if one having a claim against a
corporation were required to sue at its domicil in order to obtain
a personal judgment.6 In this case the insurance company was
"doing business" in the state at the time of suit, and in interpreting
the statute as requiring also that the company be doing business
in the state at the time when the policy was issued the court was
unduly technical.
6 204 U. S. 8 (1907).
6 STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d ed. 1951) 84.
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WAIVER OF BREACHED POLICY PROVISIONS
Arkansas. In Service Fire Insurance Company v. Payne' plain-
tiff purchased a White Truck from Schmieding Brothers. A part
of the purchase price was financed by Universal C.I.T. Credit
Corporation (hereinafter referred to as C.I.T.) through its Fort
Smith office. Harvey Mixon was the manager of the office. C.I.T.
required that the truck be insured by the Service Fire Insurance
Company. C.I.T. furnished the application form for the financing
and insurance, and Harvey Mixon and Schmieding Brothers pre-
pared it. Plaintiff (Payne) had nothing to do with procuring the
insurance on the truck, and he paid all premiums through C.I.T.
and Schmieding Brothers. Shortly after the policy was issued,
Payne, after discussing the matter with the manager of Schmied-
ing Brothers and Harvey Mixon, sold a half interest in the truck
to Shastid. Subsequently, Payne made a conditional sale of his
remaining interest to Shastid. Payne, with H. C. Schmieding as
co-maker, had also borrowed money from a bank and given a
mortgage on the truck as security.
The insurance policy made Payne and C.I.T. the insured, as
their interests might appear. The policy contained two provisions:
one stating that the policy was inapplicable during any bailment,
lease, conditional sale, mortgage, or any other encumbrance; and
the other stating that notice to any agent, or knowledge possessed
by any agent, or by any other person, should not effect a waiver,
or estop the company from asserting any right under the terms
of the policy; nor should the terms of the policy be waived or
changed except by endorsement issued to form a part of the policy.
The question in the case was whether the two provisions in the
policy would prevent the insured owner, Payne, from recovering
for destruction of the truck. The trial court held that the insured,
Payne, was not precluded from recovery, and the supreme court
affirmed, stating that the evidence was sufficient to support a find-
ing that the insurance company waived the provisions of the policy.
The insurance company and C.I.T. were so closely connected and
..Ark... 236 S. W. 2d 1020 (1951).
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related to the entire transaction as to be parties to it from the
beginning. The court said, "A fair inference, we think, would
have warranted a finding by the jury that appellant, insurance
company, had knowledge of the conditional sale of the truck, as
well as the mortgage to the bank, through the knowledge thereof of
C.I.T. and H. C. Schmieding."' The court attached significance
to the fact that the insurance company paid C.I.T. for its unpaid
interest in the truck ($1400 balance due from Payne) but refused
to pay Payne $2850.
The importance of the case rests in the treatment by the court
of C.I.T. and Schmieding as agents of the defendant insurance
company for the purpose of imputing knowledge of the breaches
of the policy provisions to the insurance company. The only facts
which could be said to support the existence of the agency relation
were the joint execution of the application for the insurance by
C.I.T. and Schmieding, and the acquiescence on the part of the
insurance company in allowing C.I.T. to collect the insurance
premiums from Payne. The court deemed them sufficient and
seemingly treated the agency relation as existing as a matter of
law.
The insurance company treated C.I.T.'s rights under the insur-
ance contract as independent and not derivative of Payne's rights,
but the court was unable to detect any reason why the insurance
company should treat the policy as valid in so far as C.I.T. was
concerned and void as to Payne.
PROOF OF LOSS AS CONDITION PRECEDENT
Louisiana. In Robbert v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of United
States9 Robbert sued to recover total and permanent disability
benefits alleged to be due under a policy. The policy provided:
"Total and Permanent Disability
"(I) Disability Benefits before age 60 shall be effective upon re-
ceipt of due proof, before default in the payment of premium, that the
Insured became totally and permanently disabled by bodily injury
or disease after this policy became effective and before its anniversary
8 236 S. W. 2d at 1022.
9 217 La. 325, 46 So. 2d 286 (1950).
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upon which the Insured's age at nearest birthday is 60 years, in which
event the Society will grant the following benefits:-
"(a) Waive Payment of All Premiums payable upon this policy
falling due after the receipt of such proof and during the continuance
of such total and permanent Disability; and
"(b) Pay to the Insured a Monthly Disability-Annuity as stated on
the face hereof; the first payment to be payable upon receipt of due
proof of such Disability and subsequent payments monthly thereafter
during the continuance of such total and permanent Disability." (Italics
supplied by the court.)
On January 7, 1939, while the policy was in effect and all premiums
paid, the plaintiff became ill and was totally disabled until August
31, 1939. During this period all premiums falling due were paid
by the plaintiff. On July 9, 1940, he was informed of the disabil-
ity provisions in the policy and presented his claim to the com-
pany. Defendant company denied liability, and plaintiff sued.
Plaintiff made no showing that the disability rendered him incapa-
ble of presenting his claim or furnishing proof in support thereof
during the eight-month disability period.
The question in the case was whether the insurance company
was liable for waiver of premiums falling due during the disabil-
ity period prior to receipt of proof of the disability, or for dis-
ability payments accruing before receipt of such proof. The dis-
trict court rendered a judgment dismissing plaintiff's action. The
supreme court affirmed, stating that the obligation of the company
to waive premiums and to make disability payments was on a
condition precedent that proof of permanent disability be sub-
mitted. The court thought that the provisions of the policy were
free from ambiguity.
Justice Hamiter concurred with the majority that the waiver of
premiums was conditioned on the receipt of proof of disability,
but he dissented as to the disability annuity provision. He stated
that the disability annuity provision was susceptible of the con-
struction that the company was liable for disability benefits from
the inception of the disability, the obligation to pay arising only
after receipt of due proof:
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"It stipulates that the company will 'Pay to the Insured a Monthly
Disability-Annuity as stated on the face hereof; the first payment to
be payable upon receipt of due proof of such Disability and subse-
quent payments monthly thereafter during the continuance of such
total and permanent disability.'
"... [P] receding the semi-colon is a complete sentence expressing
unqualifiedly an obligation to pay a monthly disability-annuity. Stand-
ing alone this could only mean payment for the entire disability. Then
follows a recitation of the method by which the annuity is to be paid,
it being that the first payment (not necessarily the first monthly pay-
ment) is payable upon receipt of due proof. This first payment, espe-
cially since the word 'monthly' is not used in connection with it, may
well be interpreted as covering all of the disability theretofore experi-
enced, that is from its inception to the date of such first payment." 10
Justice Hamiter relied also on the general rule that ambiguous
terms should be given a construction most favorable to the insured.
On rehearing the supreme court adopted Justice Hamiter's
opinion, annulled the previous affirmance of the district court's
decision, and set aside the judgment below.
Appleman states the majority rule to be that where the contract
limits recovery of benefits to the time after proof of loss is re-
ceived, or to a certain length of time after proof of loss is made,
the insured may not recover any benefits prior to the time proof
of loss is received by the insurer, regardless of the date of incep-
tion of the disability.1' Louisiana has followed this general rule,
as is evidenced by the case of Jones v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.'2
The Jones case held, under a provision of a group policy that
after receipt of proof of disability insurer would make regular
monthly payments, that the insured was not entitled to a lump
payment for the time between the date of the accident and the
date proof was made, but was entitled only to monthly payments
after proof was made. It is to be noted that this decision was by
a court of appeals. Apparently the supreme court in the reported
case has overruled this decision and has joined those jurisdictions
which oppose the general rule. These jurisdictions state that the
10 46 So. 2d at 293.
11 1 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE (1941) § 615.
12 157 So. 147 (La. App. 1934).
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time stipulated in a disability contract refers to the time of pay-
ment and not to the disabilities covered, so that while the insured
may receive no money until the date stipulated, after proof of
loss is received, the amount is calculated upon the entire period
of disability."
INJURED PARTY NOT BARRED FOR LACK OF NOTICE
TO INSURANCE COMPANY
Louisiana. In West v. Monroe Bakery Inc. 4 plaintiff sued Mon-
roe Bakery Inc. and General Casualty Company of America, Mon-
roe's insurer, for the death of his minor daughter, who was killed
as a result of negligent operation of a bakery truck. The district
court rendered judgment in solido against Monroe Bakery and
the General Casualty Company. Defendant Casualty Company
appealed. The court of appeals reversed, entering judgment in
favor of the General Casualty Company on the ground that the
insurance policy covering the bakery truck required that the as-
sured give notice to the insurer, as soon as practicable, of any
accident rendering the assured liable. The assured had failed to
give such notice. By Act 55 of 1930" a direct right of action in
solido against the assured and insurer is given to third persons
injured by the negligent operation of automobiles.
The question before the supreme court was whether the insurer
could escape liability to the third party because of the failure of
its insured to give notice as soon as practicable after the accident
had occurred. The supreme court answered in the negative, re-
versed the decision of the court of appeals and reinstated the judg-
ment of the district court. The statute expressed a public policy
that a liability insurance policy was not issued as much for the
protection of the insured as for the protection of the public. The
statute conferred a right on third persons, and the right would be
of little value if its existence depended on the action of another,
i.e., notice by the assured to the insurer.
13 1 APPLUMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE (1941) § 615.
14 217 La. 189, 46 So. 2d 122 (1950).
15 LA. GEN. STAT. (Dart, 1939) § 4248.
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Three justices dissented on the ground that the majority failed
to consider a clause in Act 55 of 1930 reading as follows: "It be-
ing the intent of this act that any action brought hereunder shall
be subject to all of the lawful conditions of the policy contract and
the defenses which could be urged by the insurer to a direct action
brought by the insured; provided the term and conditions of such
policy contract are not in violation of the laws of this State."'"
They reasoned that notice was a lawful condition, breach of which
would be a valid defense to an action by the assured and would
therefore be a defense as against the third party.
Before this case was decided, two of the courts of appeals in
Louisiana were in conflict as to the right of an insurer to defeat
an action by an injured party under Act 55 of 1930 by setting up
that the assured had failed to give the required notice. In Howard
v. Rowan17 the court stated that compliance with a policy term re-
quiring immediate notice of accidents and claims is a condition
precedent to insurer's liability. In Edwards v. Fidelity and Cas-
ualty Co. of N. Y."s the rule was stated to be that a compliance
with a policy requirement of immediate notice of accidents and
claims is not a condition precedent to the insurer's liability.
The principal case resolves the conflict in accordance with the
views expressed in Edwards v. Fidelity and Casualty Co. of N. Y.
This view is said to be against the great weight of authority. 9 How-
ever, the decision follows the trend indicated by the Financial
Responsibility Law enacted in many states and by compulsory in-
surance laws such as that enacted in Massachusetts.2"
"PERMISSION" UNDER AN "OMNIBUS CLAUSE"
Louisiana. In Dominguez v. American Casualty Co." plaintiff
sued Thomas and his insurer for damages resulting from an auto-
mobile accident caused by the negligence of Thomas' employee,
Williams. Williams was employed as a truck driver; his duties
16 46 So. 2d at 131. Italics added by the court.
17 154 So. 382 (La. App. 1934).
is 11 La. App. 176, 123 So. 162 (1929).
19 See Comment, 10 Tulane L. Rev. 69 (1936).
20 MAss. GEN. LAWS (Ter. Ed. 1932) c. 175, § 113A.
21 217 La. 487, 46 So. 2d 744 (1950).
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were to drive employees to Thomas' mill in the morning, deliver
loads of wood during the day, and take the employees back into.
town in the evening; after which he drove the truck to his home
and parked it until the following morning. Thomas had specifically
instructed Williams not to use the truck for his own personal use.
On the night of the accident Williams had taken the truck to assist
a fellow employee in pulling his car out of a ditch. En route the
accident occurred, between 10:30 p. m. and 11:00 p. m.
The insurance policy, in the "Omnibus Clause," -defined the
insured as the named insured and any person using the automo-
bile, provided the actual use of the automobile was with the per-
mission of the named insured.
Plaintiff recovered judgment in the trial court, but the court of
appeals reversed and dismissed the suit on the ground that, assum-
ing the employee was negligent, the negligence was not charge-
able to the employer and his insurer. The question on appeal was
whether the conclusion that Williams was operating the truck
without permission of the insured within the contemplation of the
policy was correct.
The supreme court held that Williams was operating the car
with the permission of Thomas, and reversed and remanded. The
court stated that Louisiana was one of the jurisdictions holding
that initial permission by the employer is all that is required to
constitute "permission" to an employee under an "Omnibus
Clause." The court gave weight to the fact that the employee had
complete dominion and control of the vehicle day and night, and
to say he lost the initial permission merely because he parked the
truck for a short time would be a highly technical distinction.
There was a dissent on the ground that an extension of the
"initial permission" rule to the facts in this case was going too
far. It was argued that the initial permission ended when Williams
parked the car after work and that when he took it to help the
fellow employee some six or seven hours later, said use was ex-
pressly forbidden by the employer and was outside the employer's
contemplation.
The result would seem to place Louisiana among those jurisdic-
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tions which have adopted the "Hell or High Water Rule": ".... if
the vehicle was originally entrusted by the named insured ... to
the person operating it at the time of the accident, then, despite
hell or high water, such operation is considered to be within the
scope of the permission granted, regardless of how grossly the
terms of the original bailment may have been violated."2 Cer-
tainly it can be said that the initial permission granted (to take
the employees to the mill, deliver loads of wood during the day,
and take the employees back into town in the evening) did not
extend beyond a reasonable time necessary to drive the employees
back into town in the evening. To approve the majority opinion is
to say that six or seven hours was a reasonable time to return the
employees to town. The dissent would seem to be on sounder
ground; when Williams parked the truck in the evening, the initial
permission ended.
OBTAINING PROPERTY UNDER FALSE PRETENSES-COVERAGE
*: OF THEFT POLICY (BROAD FORM)
Oklahoma. In Thompson v. Conn. Fire Ins. Co.2" recovery was
sought under an insurance policy by the terms of which defend-
ant company agreed to pay the cash value of insured's automobile
in the event of its loss by theft (broad form). Plaintiff Thompson
alleged that one Markley had agreed to give him $750 for his
automobile and gave him a check for that amount. In pursuance
of the agreement Thompson assigned his title to the automobile
to Markley and gave his possession. The following day Thompson
learned he had taken a "hot check." Defendant insurance com-
pany demurred to the complaint, and the question was whether
Markley's acts constituted larceny under Oklahoma law. The per-
tinent statute says: "Larceny is the taking of personal property
accomplished by fraud or stealth, and with intent to deprive an-
other thereof."2 4 The trial court held that the acts did not amount
to'larceny and dismissed the action.
22 7 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTCE (1941) § 4366.
23 --- Okla .............. 223 P. 2d 757 (1950).
14 21 OKLA. STAT. ANN. (Perm. Ed.) § 1701.
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The supreme court affirmed the action of the trial court and
stated: ".... [W]here the owner of an automobile enters into a con-
tract of sale of the automobile, assigns his certificate of title to the
vendee, and in pursuance of his contract of sale transfers posses.
sion and title to the vendee who pays therefor with a worthless or
forged check, and in connection therewith makes false statements
as to the genuineness of said check, and other false statements, the
offense is obtaining property under false pretenses and does not
constitute theft within the terms of an insurance policy which
insures the owner against loss by 'theft (broad form).' "25
Whether the facts in any given case amount to theft or obtain-
ing property under false pretenses depends on the statutes in each
state. The distinction between the two offenses lies in what the
owner intended to pass. If in parting with possession the owner also
intended to part with title, the offense is obtaining property by
false pretenses. If the owner did not intend to part with title, the
offense is theft or larceny.26
"PREMISES OPERATIONS" INCLUDE INCIDENTAL OPERATIONS
ELSEWHERE
Texas. In Lloyds Casualty Insurer v. McCrary27 Lloyds issued
to Grimes, doing business as Crockett Butane Service, a "Manu-
facturer's and Contractor's Policy" of liability insurance. During
the policy period Grimes and his son installed a butane gas sys-
tem in a house belonging to McCrary. The installation was not
completed in that the pressure gauge, valves and fittings on the
storage tanks were defective. Grimes knew of these defects and
intended to complete the installation at a later date by repairing
or exchanging the defective apparatus. Before the defect was cor-
rected, a leak in the gas system caused a fire destroying McCrary's
house and his tenant's household goods. McCrary recovered a
judgment against Grimes, and the execution issued was returned
25 223 P. 2d at 761.
26 32 Am. Jut., Larceny, § 7, p. 89.
,27 Tex..., 229 S. W. 2d 605 (1950).
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nulla bona; whereupon McCrary sued to recover the amount of
the judgment from Grimes' insurer.
Under the insuring agreement the insurance company agreed
to pay all property damage for which the insured became liable
under the law, if the damage was caused by accident and arose
out of the hazards enumerated. The "Premises Operations" haz-
ard was defined as "the ownership, maintenance or use of the
premises, and all operations during the policy period which are
necessary or incidental thereto."
The trial court held that plaintiff failed to state a cause of
action, and plaintiff appealed. The court of civil appeals certified
to the supreme court the question whether the clause "Premises
Operations" covered damages occurring on premises other than
those of the insured.
The supreme court reversed the judgment of the trial court and
held that the clause did cover operations on premises other than
those of the insured and that a cause of action was stated. The
holding was based on the inclusion in the hazard clause of the
phrase, "and all operations during the policy which are necessary
or incidental thereto." The phrase covered all operations, whether
on the premises or elsewhere, if they were incidental or necessary
in relation to the declared use of the premises. The business of the
insured was "Butane Gas Operation," and it was reasonable to
conclude that a necessary or incidental use of the premises for the
declared purpose would include installation of butane systems on
premises elsewhere. The court adopted the much quoted rule:
"6... ambiguous terms of an insurance policy should be construed
in favor of the insured where they are reasonably susceptible of
such a construction. "28
This holding is in accord with the general rule that in the
absence of restrictions, a policy indemnifying against liabilities
resulting from the the performance of certain designated work or
operations covers liabilities resulting from the performance of
ordinary operations incidental to the designated work.29
28 229 S. W. 2d at 609.
29 45 C. J. S., Insurance, § 828, p. 882.
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RATE-UP OF PREMIUM AS COUNTER OFFER
Texas. In Republic National Life Insurance Co. v. Hall" plain-
tiff made an application for a twenty year pay life policy through
a Mr. Coder, the local soliciting agent of defendant insurance com-
pany. The insured was 36 years old, and because he was "over-
weight," Mr. Coder informed him that his premium rate would
be slightly higher than normal. Mr. Coder testified that Hall said
he still wanted the insurance.
The application contained a blank space for the amount of the
premium which was not filled in. It also contained another blank
space entitled, "Home Office Corrections or Additions." The last
line of the executed application read, "I have paid the Agent tak-
ing this application cash $ ............ being the Mo. S. S. premium
hereon."
At the time of making the application Hall signed and delivered
to defendant's agent a "Salary Deduction Order" to cover future
premiums. A medical report, the application, and the "Salary De-
duction Order" were forwarded to the home office. Defendant com-
pany then issued a policy of insurance in accord with the appli-
cation, registered the policy with the State Department of Insur-
ance and then mailed the policy to the agent. Defendant company
had rated up Hall's age from 36 to 44 so that his premium was
about $140 per year more than normal. The rated up premium
was written in the blank space entitled "Home Office Corrections
or Additions."
Hall, before he received the policy from the agent, was killed in
an airplane crash. The question in the case was whether a contract
of insurance existed between Hall and defendant at the time of
his death. In the trial court the jury found that Hall and the insur-
ance company had intended the policy to become effective when
mailed by the defendant to its agent shortly before Hall's death,
and a judgment for recovery on the policy was entered. The court
of civil appeals affirmed the judgment.
The supreme court reversed stating that, as in the case of all
contracts, the offer and acceptance in insurance negotiations must
30 ------------ Tex . ------ , 232 S. W .2d 697 (1950).
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be such as to evidence a complete agreement and that an essential
element to be agreed upon in a life insurance contract is the
amount of the premium. Since the insurance company rated up
the policy, there was no meeting of the minds, or agreement, on
the new rate until Hall accepted'the policy. When the insurance
company sent the policy to its agent, a counter offer was made which
had to be accepted before the insurance contract came into exist-
ence. The court said that there was insufficient evidence to support
the jury verdict that a contract existed after the insurance com-
pany mailed the policy to its agent and before the insured's death.
There was a dissent in the case based on the theory that there
was sufficient evidence to make it a fact question for the jury as to
whether the contract was made. It was not fatal, as a matter of
law, to the making of a contract that a blank amount was to be
filled in where one party entrusted it to another in the narrow
range here involved (the rate-up of a healthy 36-year-old man
because he was overweight).
A strict application of the general rule stated by Appleman to
the effect that "he [the insured] is not bound to take a life policy
raising the premium above that proposed in the application" sup-
ports the majority opinion." However, this rule is subject to the
qualification that the insured would be bound to take a life policy
raising the premium, if the rated up premium was "proposed in
the application."
It would seem that there was sufficient evidence to justify a
finding that Hall, in his application, proposed a premium which
included a reasonable rate-up for his being overweight, the rate-up
to be determined by known standards and policies of defendant
insurance company. Such an understanding would satisfy the
requirement that the terms of an offer be definite.32 The theory
of the dissent appears to have considerable merit.
Morton 1. Hanlon.
3112 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE (1941) § 7151.
82 1 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 32.
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